weuse.cash Report : Visit Site


  • Ranking Alexa Global: # 8,660,403

    Server:cloudflare...
    X-Powered-By:PHP/5.4.45

    The main IP address: 104.24.113.199,Your server Singapore,Singapore ISP:CloudFlare Inc.  TLD:cash CountryCode:SG

    The description :your browser is ancient! blog videos newsletter links contact about we use cash “crypto may offer 'key blinding'. i did some research and it was obscure, but there may be something there. 'group signa...

    This report updates in 24-Jun-2018

Technical data of the weuse.cash


Geo IP provides you such as latitude, longitude and ISP (Internet Service Provider) etc. informations. Our GeoIP service found where is host weuse.cash. Currently, hosted in Singapore and its service provider is CloudFlare Inc. .

Latitude: 1.2896699905396
Longitude: 103.85006713867
Country: Singapore (SG)
City: Singapore
Region: Singapore
ISP: CloudFlare Inc.

the related websites

HTTP Header Analysis


HTTP Header information is a part of HTTP protocol that a user's browser sends to called cloudflare containing the details of what the browser wants and will accept back from the web server.

X-Powered-By:PHP/5.4.45
Transfer-Encoding:chunked
Set-Cookie:PHPSESSID=r104atmja5acpnrbb9tdvess43; path=/
Expires:Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Vary:Accept-Encoding
Server:cloudflare
Connection:keep-alive
Link:; rel="https://api.w.org/"
Pragma:no-cache
Cache-Control:no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Date:Sat, 23 Jun 2018 17:14:36 GMT
CF-RAY:42f89784d7880ec7-EWR
Content-Type:text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Encoding:gzip

DNS

soa:dean.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2028116486 10000 2400 604800 3600
ns:dean.ns.cloudflare.com.
donna.ns.cloudflare.com.
mx:MX preference = 10, mail exchanger = mx.hover.com.cust.hostedemail.com.
ipv4:IP:104.24.113.199
ASN:13335
OWNER:CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US
Country:US
IP:104.24.112.199
ASN:13335
OWNER:CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US
Country:US
ipv6:2400:cb00:2048:1::6818:70c7//13335//CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US//US
2400:cb00:2048:1::6818:71c7//13335//CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US//US

HtmlToText

your browser is ancient! blog videos newsletter links contact about we use cash “crypto may offer 'key blinding'. i did some research and it was obscure, but there may be something there. 'group signatures' may be related.” – satoshi nakamoto, 2010 - select - bitcoin privacy issues fungibility issues properties of money war on cash why fungibility matters monero default privacy default fungibility digital cash skip to content properties of money war on cash why fungibility matters monero default privacy stealth addresses ringct default fungibility ring signatures transparent emission digital cash bitcoin privacy issues mixing, coinjoin, etc sidechains, zerocash, etc fungibility issues self-censorship blacklisting whitelisting uncategorized preserving xmr privacy? software implementation matters! 2018-01-18 published by: admin this title and content of this article was changed because the developer of xwallet addressed the concerns raised by weuse.cash. i won’t remove it because it’s still an interesting case of chainanalysis on the monero blockchain. we are thankful towards justin that he eventually understood the issue and decided to change his software implementation in such a way that the privacy of the users of his app is preserved. on jan 25 the source code for monero xwallet for ios was released. justin smith (rusticbison) said on different occasions that he wants to monetize this app. let me be clear from the start: i don’t have anything against this model. if you want to monetize your hard work, you should! but there is an issue with the way justin wanted to monetize the app. monero’s core value is privacy. i had good reasons to assume that the way xwallet were to be monetized would have been detrimental for the users’ privacy. let’s explore this in this article. note that for the larger part of the article i try to simplify the explanation by ignoring the fact that ring signatures are being used. this is what the source was telling us about how the app were to be monetized: the wallet provider fee is a flat 0.0005 xmr per outgoing transaction. this means that every transaction would usually have 3 outputs: “payment”, “change” and “wallet fee”, while a non-xwallet transaction would usually only have 2 outputs: “payment” and “change”. let’s look at how a normal transaction would look like compared to an xwallet transaction. note that the image only shows one input. in general a transaction would have one or two inputs. however, if a user would have a lot of small unspent outputs in their wallet and wanted to send big amount, it’s possible that a lot more inputs were present in this transaction. but this was not the whole picture… one could have expected that people using wallets would spend their change in the same way as they spent the original input. this is how in general normal user behavior would have looked like: (note that tx3, tx4 and tx6 have 2 inputs and the other transactions only have 1 input) what’s clear from the image is that it would not at all have been obvious to see which output was the “payment” and which output was the “change” due to the fact that every transaction had 2 outputs. and due to the xmr stealth addresses, there wouldn’t ever be a reuse of the same (one time) address, making it nearly impossible to “cluster” certain txo’s. this means that the wallet privacy would be preserved. now let’s look at how an xwallet transactions looked like. tx1 would be the first transaction using xwallet. it would have generated 3 outputs, as explained at the start. we see that tx3 and tx4 only would have had 2 outputs, so we can assume that these wouldn’t be xwallet transactions. tx2 on the other hand would have 3 outputs! so the first obvious conclusion we can make is that tx2 would probably have been the xwallet user who sent out tx1 as well as using his change (o1) stemming from tx1. this means that we would have been able to cluster every transaction this user broadcasts using his xwallet. let’s analyze this transaction graph a bit more: tx4 would very likely have been a transaction made by the xwallet company grouping a bunch of the 0.0005 xmr wallet fee txo’s and sending them to a another wallet. we already established that o1 would be the change, so this means that it would have been very likely that the payment output in tx1 is o2. this transaction analysis would have been very bad for your privacy. let’s expand our transaction graph a bit to show why: in this example i’ve added 4 transactions. tx5 and tx7 would clearly be xwallet-transactions while tx6 and tx8 would not. tx4 is still grouping wallet fees. it’s obvious using the same analysis techniques that tx1, tx2, tx5 and tx7 are would have been performed by the same user of xwallet. these transactions could be clustered. if tx1 would receive funds from an exchange wallet, this cluster of transactions would be identified and the user’s privacy would be at risk. imagine that a darknetmarket is taken down and they are seizing the wallets. law enforcement has possession of the logs of outgoing and incoming transactions. a vendor has taken out xmr via tx6 and tx8 and received xmr from tx5 and tx7. if this vendor would perform a few successive transactions after tx6 and tx8, his funds would be anonymous. but… in this case there would have been a way to trace back the origin of the funds! tx6 gets input i1 from tx5o1. note that this was received using a ring signature, so it’s either tx5o1 or one of the decoys in the ring signature. if law enforcement would visit the user of xwallet based on this information alone, he would still somewhat be able to plausibly deny that he send out tx5. thanks to the ring signatures, it could have been one of the decoys. but… tx7 also shows up in the logs of the darknetmarket as an incoming transaction. i2 from tx8 originated from tx7o2! and this transaction is part of the cluster of the xwallet user! what are the odds that 2 times a transaction accidentally picked a decoy from the same cluster? this doesn’t really sound that likely. so now it would become almost a certainty that the suspicious user of xwallet did indeed performed tx5 and tx7, regardless of the use of ring signatures. if the dnm buyer would have used a normal wallet (the gui, monerujo, …) the blockchain data wouldn’t contain any identifying transactions with 3 outputs and his privacy would be preserved. i think this example clearly shows why people needed to avoid the initial implementation of xwallet if they wanted to preserve their privacy using monero. xwallet original implementation would have weakened other people’s privacy as well! we already established that when an xwallet user would have spent xmr he would be clustering his transactions. but this also means that certain txo’s would have been able to be marked as “spent”. in the above example all change outputs and wallet fee outputs from the cluster tx1, tx2, tx5 and tx7 would likely have been spent. to be exact, this list of txo’s would likely have been spent: tx1o1, tx1o3, tx2o1, tx2o3, tx5o2, tx5o3 and tx7o3. note that we can know this just by analyzing the blockchain. normally, thanks to ring signatures, we can’t really know if a certain txo is spent or not. but due to the fact that we can cluster the user behaviour, we can, with a very high degree of certainty “guess” that these txo’s are in fact spent. this means that if your wallet picks a decoy from this set of outputs, chain analyzing software can just ignore this decoy. it was already spent in a previous transaction. so in case you’re using the default ring size of 5, your effective ring size is reduced to 4. so if people are using xwallet, it can actually weaken other people’s privacy as well! suggestions on how to monetize xwallet in a privacy-preserving way xwallet eventually chose to become donationware. i you use the app, please consider donating to the development: 48u79gbhhdo6pts6daxfvn7fq2ql9bhaqnfqtgzbggu5fjvax7zjtvjnxahtj71w3y81cc9vcuh7rniz37bc9h

URL analysis for weuse.cash


http://weuse.cash/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/afb_3-2.png
http://weuse.cash/2017/03/27/thoughts-on-mining-centralization-and-pos-weaknesses/
http://weuse.cash/#content
http://weuse.cash/2016/10/28/the-untrusted-setup/
http://weuse.cash/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/afb_4.png
http://weuse.cash/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/afb_1.png
http://weuse.cash/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/dash4.png
http://weuse.cash/2016/10/28/the-untrusted-setup/#comment-141
http://weuse.cash/waroncash/
http://weuse.cash/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/screenshot-from-2016-06-09-030230.png
http://weuse.cash/2016/06/09/btc-xmr-zcash/
http://weuse.cash/2016/10/28/
http://weuse.cash/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/dash3.png
http://weuse.cash/#top-navigation
http://weuse.cash/2017/02/

Whois Information


Whois is a protocol that is access to registering information. You can reach when the website was registered, when it will be expire, what is contact details of the site with the following informations. In a nutshell, it includes these informations;

Domain Name: weuse.cash
Registry Domain ID: 367bd63b7fad4622917e2254f93ece31-DONUTS
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.tucows.com
Registrar URL: http://www.tucows.com
Updated Date: 2018-03-24T18:28:03Z
Creation Date: 2015-11-09T14:09:19Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2018-11-09T14:09:19Z
Registrar: Tucows Domains Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 69
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: [email protected]
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: 416.535.0123x1283
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Registry Registrant ID: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Name: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Organization: Contact Privacy Inc. Customer 0141733216
Registrant Street: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant City: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant State/Province: ON
Registrant Postal Code: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Country: CA
Registrant Phone: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Phone Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Fax: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Fax Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Registry Admin ID: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Name: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Organization: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Street: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin City: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin State/Province: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Postal Code: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Country: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Phone: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Phone Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Fax: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Fax Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Registry Tech ID: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Name: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Organization: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Street: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech City: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech State/Province: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Postal Code: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Country: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Phone: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Phone Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Fax: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Fax Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Name Server: dean.ns.cloudflare.com
Name Server: donna.ns.cloudflare.com
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2018-06-23T17:09:30Z <<<

For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://icann.org/epp

Terms of Use: Donuts Inc. provides this Whois service for information purposes, and to assist persons in obtaining information about or related to a domain name registration record. Donuts does not guarantee its accuracy. Users accessing the Donuts Whois service agree to use the data only for lawful purposes, and under no circumstances may this data be used to: a) allow, enable, or otherwise support the transmission by e-mail, telephone, or facsimile of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations to entities other than the registrar’s own existing customers and b) enable high volume, automated, electronic processes that send queries or data to the systems of Donuts or any ICANN-accredited registrar, except as reasonably necessary to register domain names or modify existing registrations. When using the Donuts Whois service, please consider the following: The Whois service is not a replacement for standard EPP commands to the SRS service. Whois is not considered authoritative for registered domain objects. The Whois service may be scheduled for downtime during production or OT&E maintenance periods. Queries to the Whois services are throttled. If too many queries are received from a single IP address within a specified time, the service will begin to reject further queries for a period of time to prevent disruption of Whois service access. Abuse of the Whois system through data mining is mitigated by detecting and limiting bulk query access from single sources. Where applicable, the presence of a [Non-Public Data] tag indicates that such data is not made publicly available due to applicable data privacy laws or requirements. Should you wish to contact the registrant, please refer to the Whois records available through the registrar URL listed above. Access to non-public data may be provided, upon request, where it can be reasonably confirmed that the requester holds a specific legitimate interest and a proper legal basis for accessing the withheld data. Access to this data can be requested by submitting a request via the form found at https://donuts.domains/about/policies/whois-layered-access/ Donuts Inc. reserves the right to modify these terms at any time. By submitting this query, you agree to abide by this policy.

SERVERS

  SERVER cash.whois-servers.net

  ARGS weuse.cash

  PORT 43

  TYPE domain

DOMAIN

  NAME weuse.cash

NSERVER

  DEAN.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM 173.245.59.153

  DONNA.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM 173.245.58.151

  REGISTERED yes

Go to top

Mistakes


The following list shows you to spelling mistakes possible of the internet users for the website searched .

  • www.uweuse.com
  • www.7weuse.com
  • www.hweuse.com
  • www.kweuse.com
  • www.jweuse.com
  • www.iweuse.com
  • www.8weuse.com
  • www.yweuse.com
  • www.weuseebc.com
  • www.weuseebc.com
  • www.weuse3bc.com
  • www.weusewbc.com
  • www.weusesbc.com
  • www.weuse#bc.com
  • www.weusedbc.com
  • www.weusefbc.com
  • www.weuse&bc.com
  • www.weuserbc.com
  • www.urlw4ebc.com
  • www.weuse4bc.com
  • www.weusec.com
  • www.weusebc.com
  • www.weusevc.com
  • www.weusevbc.com
  • www.weusevc.com
  • www.weuse c.com
  • www.weuse bc.com
  • www.weuse c.com
  • www.weusegc.com
  • www.weusegbc.com
  • www.weusegc.com
  • www.weusejc.com
  • www.weusejbc.com
  • www.weusejc.com
  • www.weusenc.com
  • www.weusenbc.com
  • www.weusenc.com
  • www.weusehc.com
  • www.weusehbc.com
  • www.weusehc.com
  • www.weuse.com
  • www.weusec.com
  • www.weusex.com
  • www.weusexc.com
  • www.weusex.com
  • www.weusef.com
  • www.weusefc.com
  • www.weusef.com
  • www.weusev.com
  • www.weusevc.com
  • www.weusev.com
  • www.weused.com
  • www.weusedc.com
  • www.weused.com
  • www.weusecb.com
  • www.weusecom
  • www.weuse..com
  • www.weuse/com
  • www.weuse/.com
  • www.weuse./com
  • www.weusencom
  • www.weusen.com
  • www.weuse.ncom
  • www.weuse;com
  • www.weuse;.com
  • www.weuse.;com
  • www.weuselcom
  • www.weusel.com
  • www.weuse.lcom
  • www.weuse com
  • www.weuse .com
  • www.weuse. com
  • www.weuse,com
  • www.weuse,.com
  • www.weuse.,com
  • www.weusemcom
  • www.weusem.com
  • www.weuse.mcom
  • www.weuse.ccom
  • www.weuse.om
  • www.weuse.ccom
  • www.weuse.xom
  • www.weuse.xcom
  • www.weuse.cxom
  • www.weuse.fom
  • www.weuse.fcom
  • www.weuse.cfom
  • www.weuse.vom
  • www.weuse.vcom
  • www.weuse.cvom
  • www.weuse.dom
  • www.weuse.dcom
  • www.weuse.cdom
  • www.weusec.om
  • www.weuse.cm
  • www.weuse.coom
  • www.weuse.cpm
  • www.weuse.cpom
  • www.weuse.copm
  • www.weuse.cim
  • www.weuse.ciom
  • www.weuse.coim
  • www.weuse.ckm
  • www.weuse.ckom
  • www.weuse.cokm
  • www.weuse.clm
  • www.weuse.clom
  • www.weuse.colm
  • www.weuse.c0m
  • www.weuse.c0om
  • www.weuse.co0m
  • www.weuse.c:m
  • www.weuse.c:om
  • www.weuse.co:m
  • www.weuse.c9m
  • www.weuse.c9om
  • www.weuse.co9m
  • www.weuse.ocm
  • www.weuse.co
  • weuse.cashm
  • www.weuse.con
  • www.weuse.conm
  • weuse.cashn
  • www.weuse.col
  • www.weuse.colm
  • weuse.cashl
  • www.weuse.co
  • www.weuse.co m
  • weuse.cash
  • www.weuse.cok
  • www.weuse.cokm
  • weuse.cashk
  • www.weuse.co,
  • www.weuse.co,m
  • weuse.cash,
  • www.weuse.coj
  • www.weuse.cojm
  • weuse.cashj
  • www.weuse.cmo
Show All Mistakes Hide All Mistakes